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Abstract 
This paper focuses on fair value measurement under the IFRS 13 assumptions and 
the reliability of the market and transaction multiples evaluations (“Level 2” 
methods). We test the reliability of multiples evaluation approaches in different 
economic sectors, by comparing the fair value of 1678 companies estimated by 
multiples with the effective market capitalization over 15 years. Multiples’ fair value 
does not provide a reliable measure of a company’s value, with a gap that varies 
depending upon portfolios and time. In the case of observable Level 2 fair value 
indicators for a market, such as market multiples, the company’s fair value is not 
consistent with the real market value. Thus, whenever Level 2 indicators are not 
observable, the method is increasing volatility and intrinsic evaluation risk. 
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The present work focuses on the appraisal of private equity fair value under the 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement assumptions, building upon the previous findings 
of Palea and Maino (2013). Based on the assumption that, under market efficiency 
hypothesis, the fair value is well represented by market capitalization, Palea and 
Maino observe that inconsistencies arise when estimating the enterprise value of a 
listed company with market and transaction multiples. In particular, they assert that 
their “statistical analysis supports the claim that market and transaction multiples 
cannot provide a faithful representation of the real-world economic phenomena they 
purport to represent. Consistently with Kim and Ritter (1999), market and 
transaction multiples perform very poorly”. 
Market multiples and transaction multiples appraisal of the enterprise value are 
categorized by IFRS 13 in “Level 2” of the fair value estimation techniques 
hierarchy. As the two methodologies are both based on market-wide and peer 
analyses, the value that arises from calculation using one of the two is expected to 
closely approximate the real fair value of a company. The purpose of this contribution 
is to test if this actually holds in practice. Our research question can therefore be 
formulated as follows: Are market and transaction multiples capable of 
estimating correctly the real fair value of a company, catching firm-specific risk 
factors? 
In order to resolve this research question, extending Palea and Maino (2013) in 
terms of years and number of firms included in the analysis, we set up an 
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empirical test to compare the market capitalization and the enterprise value calculated 
by market and transaction multiples on a larger dataset. Specifically, we compare the 
fair value estimated by market and transaction multiples with the effective market 
capitalization over 15 years (2003-2017).  
We argue that fair value as defined by IFRS 13, and evaluated by market and 
transaction multiples approaches, does not provide a reliable measure of the real 
value of a company, the difference between evaluated and real fair value varying 
depending upon portfolios and periods of time.  
The results are significant because in the case of observable Level 2 fair value 
indicators, such as market multiples, the fair value is not consistent with the real 
market value of the equity. This raises issues regarding private equity evaluation, 
where Level 2 indicators are not easily observable, non-viable for catching firm-
specific risk factors and potentially increasing volatility and intrinsic evaluation risk.
 
2. Quality of information, fair value measurement and firm value 
From an investor’s perspective, the quality of financial statement information is 
crucial for the investment decision making process. In particular, any estimation error 
that occurs in accounting information increases the information-processing costs for 
the users, the estimation risk premium and the investors’ adverse selection. Any 
reduction in the quality of information of financial statements increases the cost of 
capital to the company (Baiman & Verrecchia, 1996; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
This, in turn, leads to a reduction in the firm’s assets because of the uncertainty the 
investors perceive in the accounting information.  
This is particularly true in the case of subjectivity of accounting information, such 
as in the case of estimates. In these cases, managers tend to exert their decisional 
power and abuse discretion, which leads to biases in their estimations (Aboody, 
Barth, & Kasznik, 2006; Bartov, Mohanram, & Nissim, 2007).  
When the biases are foreseeable, investors tend to predict and consider them in the 
firm’s value estimation; when the biases are unexpected and unpredictable, the 
accounting information quality deteriorates, the firm’s value decreases and the 
investors are less capable of monitoring managerial decisions and behaviors (Bens & 
Monahan, 2004; Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Bushman & Smith, 2001; Hope & Thomas, 
2008; Kanodia, Sapra, & Venugopalan, 2004; Lombardo & Pagano, 2002). This 
creates a vicious circle where unreliable information gradually reduces the firm’s 
value in the mid- and long-term. 
In order to reduce the information asymmetry that could arise in those cases and to 
improve the quality of information, the prevalent opinion held by both the standard 
setters and prevalent academic literature is that the best and most relevant 
information for financial statement users is provided by the fair value (Barth, Beaver, 
& Landsman, 2001). 
The fair value of any asset, as defined by both IFRS and SFAS accounting 
principles, is the price that would be received for the sale of that asset in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date.  
In 2011 the IASB issued IFRS 13 “Fair value measurement”, which came into 
effect on January 1st, 2013 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2013). The 
standard describes a framework for fair value measurement by outlining 
methodology. As pointed out by IFRS 13, the fair value must be determined on a 
market-based and not entity-specific measurement. Thus, fair value represents an exit 
price and its measurement relies on the usage of evaluation approaches capable of 
observing the fair value from a market perspective. 
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IFRS 13 establishes a hierarchy that classifies the inputs for fair value measurement 
in three categories: 
1) Level 1 inputs: this level represents the most reliable and the most observable 
of the inputs for fair value measurement. At the first level, thus at the highest 
priority, it indicates the unadjusted quoted prices of the common shares. 
Generally, these are represented by market capitalization. The quoted prices of 
identical assets on the market are considered in this level. 
2) Level 2 inputs: this level equates fair value to: 
a. quoted prices for similar assets in active markets;  
b. quoted prices for identical or similar assets in markets that are not 
active;  
c. inputs other than quoted prices that are observable for the assets, such 
as interest rates and yield curves observable at commonly quoted 
intervals, volatilities, prepayment speeds, loss severities, credit risks 
and default rates;  
d. and inputs that are derived principally from, or corroborated by, 
observable market data by correlation or other means. 
3) Level 3 inputs: unobservable inputs, for which market data are not available. 
Usually those are made up of the best information available at the moment, and 
bring up information asymmetries between preparers of financial statements 
(managers) and users (investors); usually, Discounted Cash Flow and other 
income methods are included in this level, as they are based on internal data, 
projections, forecasts and estimates that are not directly observable on the 
market. 
The extant literature highlights how the users of a financial statement prefer 
estimations conducted through higher input levels. In particular, investors tend to 
prefer cases where the fair value is estimated via Level 1 inputs rather than Level 2 
inputs (Goh, Ng, & Yong, 2009; Kolev, 2009). The same is not true between Level 
2 and Level 3, where investors tend to value the two typologies of inputs similarly, 
in particular during market and liquidity crises (Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010). 
Assuming that for private equity, in most cases, it is not possible to obtain Level 1 
data, from an IFRS 13 perspective the Level 2 data should be preferred. This means 
that the company’s value has to be determined on the basis of market data. 
As is clear, though, private equity performance is quite different from that of public 
companies. Generally, private equities show lower average levels of economic 
returns (Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Quigley & Woodward, 2002). 
Moreover, the distribution of the economic returns shows a great asymmetry, 
presenting a long right tail of good and excellent economic returns (Cochrane, 2005). 
Determining an average value for the “peers” of the company would thus result in 
the introduction of a bias, given the presence of rare-breed outliers. 
This has also been pointed out by Kim and Ritter (1999) who, by testing the 
performance of the price-to-earnings, price-to-sales, enterprise-value-to-sales and 
enterprise-value-to-operating cash flow ratios, discover that the market multiples 
perform badly, especially when using historical data as input for the evaluation. The 
unreliability of these multiples has also been tested by Lie and Lie (2002) in a more 
general study. They find that the most commonly used market multiples (Price-to-
Earnings (P/E), Enterprise Value-to-Sales, Enterprise Value-to-EBIT(DA)) tend to 
bias the estimations by introducing valuation errors, that are not influenced by the 
cash levels of the company, but are greatly conditioned by the size of the company, 
its profitability and the extent of the intangible value. 
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Along the same lines, Palea and Maino (2013) compared the “real” fair value of a 
company (the market capitalization, that is the price paid on the market for that 
precise asset at the measurement moment) with the fair value determined on “Level 
2” inputs, namely the market and transaction EBITDA multiples. By analyzing both 
the “stock” normalized differences and the return yield, they point out that the use of 
market and transaction multiples introduces arbitrary and unrestrained estimation 
errors, and in particular overestimations. Their analysis suggests market and 
transaction multiples do not catch risk-specific firm factors, thus introducing implicit 
measurement risk in the assessment of fair value. Nonetheless, practitioners and 
academic researchers tend to make frequent use of market and transaction multiples 
to assess the fair value of a company, although concurring analyses over a large time 
period confirms that there is no agreement on which multiple performs best. The 
research that follows attempts to expand Palea and Maino (2013) analysis on a larger 
dataset and time period in order to provide further evidence of the reliability of Level 
2 inputs. 
 
3. Research design, methodology and data collection 
 
As pointed out in literature, any evaluation method produces approximations and 
inherent errors. In the case of financial statements, the introduction of such errors in 
determining asset fair values increases volatility and reduces the quality of the 
information, which can trigger a vicious circle that reduces the value of the firm in 
the medium and long term.  
As mentioned above, this paper tests the reliability of the market and transaction 
multiples methods of fair value measurement of private equities. Specifically, we 
investigate whether, even if the multiples are determined on the basis of reliable and 
unbiased market data, their use in the evaluation process for private equity fair value 
introduces great errors in the estimates. 
To test the extent of the errors introduced by the market and transaction 
multiples in measuring fair values, we consider a sample of public companies, 
which we treat as if they were private. We therefore assess their fair value by 
using Level 2 inputs. We use market capitalization as the real fair value, which 
is consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1970). We then 
compare values based on transaction and market multiples with market 
capitalization to test for estimation errors. 
In our test, we follow the best practices implemented by practitioners in private 
equity fair value estimation.  
First of all, we extract data for 1678 companies for the fiscal years 2003-2017 from 
the EIKON/DataStream database (Thomson Reuters). The companies are selected 
applying the following proxies: Active Public Companies; with Headquarters located 
in Germany, France, Italy or Spain; operating in all economic sectors, excluding 
financial. The analysis therefore covers all the population of non-financial firms in 
the four countries included in the analysis. We exclude financial firms because of 
their specificities, which do not allow comparison with industrial firms. 
The choice of country headquarters is based on the assumption that those are the 
most representative of the EU economy, with a long record of listed companies and 
relevant information made transparently available. Also, almost all of them issue 
their financial statement in Euro. For each company and each fiscal year, we extract 
the income statement and balance sheet variables indicated in appendix A.  
We created consistent portfolios of listed companies for several economic sectors, 
in order to evaluate the market multiples for all of the different sectors. We use the 
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same classification considered by the FitchRatings “European Leveraged Finance 
Multiple EV-aluator” Special Report (Svantner, Conti, & Eyerman, 2016).  
The portfolios are the following: 
 
Table 1: Portfolios considered for the analysis 
Portfolio # of companies 
Aerospace and Defense 19 
Auto and Related 55 
Chemicals 46 
Consumer Products 107 
Diversified Manufacturing 171 
Diversified Services 113 
Energy 54 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco 83 
Gaming, Lodging and Leisure 84 
Healthcare 178 
Homebuilding, Building Materials and Construction 106 
Media and Entertainment 113 
Natural Resources 36 
Retail 70 
Technology 297 
Telecom and Cable 35 
Transportation 47 
Utilities 64 
Source: our processing based on Svantner, Conti, and Eyerman (2016). 
 
Consist with the methodology applied by Fitch, we calculate the market 
multiples for each year and each portfolio. The multiples are calculated as the 
median for each of the following variables: 
• Price/Earnings per Share (MKT_PE) and Forward Price/Earnings per 
Share (MKT_PE_FWD), considering all of the companies with positive 
earnings; 
• Enterprise Value to Sales (MKT_EV_SALES) and Forward Enterprise 
Value to Sales (MKT_EV_SALES_FWD); 
• Enterprise Value to EBITDA (MKT_EV_EBITDA) and Forward 
Enterprise Value to EBITDA (MKT_EV_EBITDA_FWD), considering 
all of the companies with a positive EBITDA; 
• Enterprise Value to EBIT (MKT_EV_EBIT) and Forward Enterprise 
Value to EBIT (MKT_EV_EBIT_FWD), considering all of the 
companies with a positive EBIT. 
In the case of the multiples related to EBIT and EBITDA, we proceed to 
subtract the net debt from – or to add the net cash and cash equivalent to – 
the calculated fair value 
Appendix B reports values for each multiple grouped by portfolios and sorted 
by fiscal year. 
As mentioned above, transaction multiples are extracted from the Fitch special 
report for each portfolio. The Fitch report covers the years from 2007 to 2016 
and in some cases it has null values for specific sectors in specific years where 
data is missing. In order to increase the significance of the data and consistent 
with the best practices, we assign transaction multiples to each company for 
each year as the mean of the measurement of the year and the previous year 
(where available).  
We then apply a discount factor in order to determine the fair value of the 
minority interest. Fair values computed under the transaction multiples include 
a control premium, whereas we are comparing multiples with stock prices of 
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single shares. We therefore assume an average control premium of 35%, large 
yet realistic, since it is consistent with past empirical evidence (Hanouna et al. 
2001). Consequently, all of the transaction-multiples-based fair values are 
rather conservative. We also assume different control premiums up to 50% as 
a robustness check, which provide the same qualitative resultsi. 
We compare the results for the estimated fair value for the different multiples 
with the market capitalization value. The analysis is performed both on a yearly 
and five-year basis. The latter is particularly interesting as it includes three 
different “economic cycles”: a pre-crisis/moderate growth period (2003-2007), 
a crisis/regressive period (2008-2012) and a post-crisis/recovery period (2013-
2017). 
Appendix C reports the descriptive statistics for each variable and for each 
year/period. All the variables are correlated to the market capitalization at a 
statistical significance level of p<0.01. 
Furthermore, our analysis is conducted using two different perspectives. The 
first perspective focuses on the difference between market and transaction 
multiples, on the one hand, and the market capitalization, on the other hand. 
This analysis is conducted at a “portfolio level”, this being the value that an 
investor should put in its own financial statements if they held the all equities 
included in the sample. It allows the determination of whether the market 
multiples under- or over-estimate the fair value. It also allows the determination 
of the ripple effect that the under- or over-estimation generates in the following 
years’ profits or losses in the portfolio evaluation. 
The second perspective considers the ratio between the market and 
transaction multiples on the one hand, and the market capitalization on the 
other. This allows analysis of the statistical distribution of the ratios. If the ratio 
is lower than 1, this indicates that the company’s fair value is underestimated 
by the multiples in comparison with the market capitalization. If the ratio is 
greater than 1, this indicates that the company’s fair value is overestimated by 
market multiples when compared to market capitalization.  
We determine the moments of the distribution, and in particular quartiles, 
median, skewness and kurtosis, which allows testing of the level of accuracy of 
the market and transaction multiples method of evaluation at a single-company 
level.  
 
4. Data analysis and discussion of findings 
 
4.1. Analysis of the portfolio fair values: estimation of the biases introduced by 
market and transaction multiples and their effect on asset values and balance 
sheet 
As mentioned above, we first investigate the reliability of the market multiples 
methods by comparing results at portfolio level. The fair value of the portfolio is 
calculated by summing all the fair values (market capitalization and estimated fair 
values) for each year. The full values are reported in Appendix D. In order to render 
a proper and comprehensible picture of the results, they are scaled to a common 
factor, by normalizing the market capitalization at the date of December 31st 2003 to 
1000 and by scaling all the other values to it.  
Figure 1 depicts normalized results for the “historical” multiples and their 
polynomial interpolation through the years, while Figure 2 shows results for 
“forward” multiples. At first glance, both graphs suggest that the use of market 
multiples estimation techniques is not reliable in most of the cases. 
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P/E FAIR VALUES 
The P/E market multiple (figure 1, dotted bar) shows a threefold trend. In the pre-
crisis years (2003-2007) it shows a quite large excess value of +18 to +26% from the 
market capitalization (medium gray bar). During the crisis years (2008-2012) it 
shows a more conservative attitude, with smaller differences of –3.7% to +9.5%. In 
the post-crisis upswing the volatility is slightly exacerbated, with a –9.8% to +4.5% 
wavering in the portfolio evaluation during the period. Taken as a whole, the P/E 
market multiple does not seem not capable of depicting the correct value for the 
portfolio, with a high volatility in the results and in the reliability.  
The next table shows the percentage difference of the multiple and the standard 
deviation to mean ratio difference from the market capitalization. 
 
Table 2: P/E-fair-value percent difference from market capitalization and 
standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
+2.0 +26.2 +19.6 +18.4 +26.8 (3.7) +9.5 +3.8 +2.7 (3.3) +1.2 (4.0) +4.5 (9.8) (6.0) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(19.3) (14.8) +26.5 +11.4 +19.5 (44.4) +0.8 (7.2) (18.8) (15.2) +4.3 (46.1) (31.2) (62.3) (27.3) 
Source: our processing. 
 
The P/E forward market multiple (figure 2, dotted bar) shows a behavior that is 
even more volatile. The smallest differences can be found in the pre-crisis (2005-
2007) and first periods of the crisis (2008-2009), with differences in the range of –
4% to +0.8%. In all the other years and periods, the differences are significantly 
larger (–10.6% down to –22.9%). Moreover, the differences are not correlated to the 
“historical” P/E market multiple, not even with a time lag.  
 
Table 3: P/E-forward-fair-value percent difference from market capitalization and 
standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
(21.2) (8.9) (2.5) (2.4) +0.8 +0.7 (4.0) (18.5) (10.9) (19.3) (10.6) (21.5) (17.3) (22.9) (19.2) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(69.8) (20.0) +12.4 +1.4 +3.3 (26.0) +6.3 (16.9) (17.3) (11.1) +12.9 (36.8) (39.3) (63.7) (32.0) 
Source: our processing. 
 
 
EV/SALES FAIR VALUES 
During 2004-2006 period, the EV/Sales multiple fair value (figure 1, squared bar) 
is less than 5% higher than the market capitalization (medium gray bar). Quite the 
opposite during crisis and recession (2007-2013), when the market multiple severely 
underestimates the fair value of the enterprise, with offset peaks greater than –10%. 
Also, in the post-crisis period, the volatility is even greater, with rises and falls in 
values up to +15.8% and down to –9%. 
 
Table 4: EV/sales-fair-value percent difference from market capitalization and 
standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
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(7.3) +4.8 +2.4 +4.5 (9.1) (23.1) (8.6) (8.4) (10.5) (11.6) (6.9) +6.0 +15.8 +3.8 (9.4) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(32.1) +16.9 +63.8 +62.0 +37.7 +23.0 (0.6) +20.3 +31.9 +23.6 +19.2 +33.4 +51.8 (4.0) +11.0 
Source: our processing. 
 
Again, the “forward” multiple (squared bar on figure 2) shows great deviations 
from the real fair value, with large variations between different years.  
 
Table 5: EV/sales-forward-fair-value percent difference from market 
capitalization and standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
(3.8) (2.3) (9.5) (11.4) (19.4) (27.0) (2.3) (18.3) (18.1) (19.6) (14.8) (7.1) 0.7 (3.9) (24.0) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(37.4) (17.3) +30.7 +29.5 +10.4 +1.0 (6.7) +3.2 +10.3 +15.9 +12.6 +17.9 +23.0 +1.3 (3.5) 
Source: our processing. 
 
EV/EBITDA FAIR VALUES 
The EV/EBITDA multiple (figure 1, diagonal line filled bar) is one of the most 
acknowledged and used in practice, together with the P/E multiple. Our analysis, 
however, shows that, at portfolio level, the multiple performs poorly in any period 
and economic situation, with almost constant overestimations greater than +15% 
(except from year 2003, 2013 and 2017) and up to almost +39%.  
Also, the overestimations fluctuate through the years with no predictable pattern, 
which is consistent with Palea and Maino (2013). 
 
Table 6: EV/EBITDA-fair-value percent difference from market capitalization and 
standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
+14.5 +29.5 +39.4 +29.1 +17.2 +8.8 +38.9 +17.2 +32.0 +34.2 +7.4 +19.8 +19.4 +20.4 (5.4) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(33.8) +28.5 +142.1 +108.2 +87.7 +53.4 +0.3 +50.7 +26.7 +107.0 (13.2) +22.7 (14.5) (25.9) (31.6) 
Source: our processing. 
 
In this case, the EV/EBITDA forward multiple (figure 2, diagonal line filled bar) 
seems to perform better than the “historical” multiple, although with deviations 
similar to those of the other multiples. More specifically, it shows severe losses in 
reliability during the crisis period (2007-2012) and high volatility during the 
economic recovery (with fluctuations that rarely leave the “below-zero” deviation). 
 
Table 7: EV/EBITDA-forward-fair-value percent difference from market 
capitalization and standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
(7.0) (0.1) +1.2 +3.1 (11.3) (11.8) +13.9 (8.5) (5.7) +6.4 +2.8 (5.5) (8.0) (9.7) (23.0) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(33.9) +27.6 +66.6 +68.9 +81.2 (6.2) (1.0) +32.7 +12.3 +116.3 (8.6) +7.6 (40.2) (41.4) (39.1) 




EV/EBIT FAIR VALUES 
As well as the previous multiples, also the EV/EBIT is one of the most commonly 
used in practice. This multiple (figure 1, horizontal line filled bar) shows great 
differences if compared with the real market capitalization fair value. In particular, 
the difference is almost in any case an over-estimation of more than +10% up to 
+42%. The volatility over the years is also pronounced, with peaks of variations, in 
particular during the crisis period (from +11.5% in 2008 to +41.7% in 2009, then 
+17.8% in 2010 and again up to +30.3% in 2011). According to our analysis, this 
multiple is one of the most unreliable of all for the estimation of the portfolio fair 
value. 
 
Table 8: EV/EBIT-fair-value percent difference from market capitalization and 
standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
+5.3 +16.2 +35.1 +20.0 +13.7 +11.5 +41.7 +17.8 +30.3 +30.8 +17.8 +17.0 +10.0 +12.9 (5.1) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(18.8) +39.6 +202.4 +111.3 +96.3 +19.8 (25.2) +27.2 +12.4 +58.5 (38.1) (17.2) (70.9) (67.9) (65.5) 
Source: our processing. 
 
In the case of the EV/EBIT forward multiple (figure 2, horizontal line filled bar), 
differences are similar to those of the other “forwards”. In fact, it results in a 
consistent underestimation in most of the years, with the same volatility and 
uncertainty during the crisis period. 
 
Table 9: EV/EBIT-forward-fair-value percent difference from market 
capitalization and standard deviation to mean ratio difference 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
(18.2) (10.1) (4.1) (11.9) (17.5) (10.7) +12.8 (8.9) (1.0) +7.4 (1.2) (8.8) (14.1) (9.9) (21.8) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
(38.2) +29.8 +97.4 +72.5 +58.9 (20.1) (18.4) +19.6 +13.8 +64.0 (36.1) (13.2) (67.3) (62.7) (64.0) 
Source: our processing. 
 
 
TRANSACTION MULTIPLES (EBITDA) FAIR VALUE 
In line with our results on market multiples, the transaction multiples calculated on 
EBITDA (figure 1, dark gray with lines fill bar), when available, show low levels of 
reliability. The values are inconsistent through the years and are greatly fluctuating 
from almost a half of the market cap value up to more than 30% greater. This would 
result in a great artificial volatility in the financial statement, that is, volatility due to 
estimation errors and not to changing economic conditions.  
 
Table 10: Net EBITDA-Transaction-multiple-fair-value percent difference from 
market capitalization 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Difference 
n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. (20.9) 32.7 (1.9) (19.2) +5.8 (22.6) (48.9) (44.4) (44.5) (34.9) (48.9) 
Standard Deviation to Mean ratio difference (%) 
n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. +54.6 +32.9 +27.6 +55.8 (1.1) (19.9) (32.7) +36.2 (43.9) (1.6) +22.0 
Source: our processing. 
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This volatility is not influenced by the premium applied to the evaluation. The next 
table reports the transaction multiples gross of the “control premium”. Results are 
consistent with those from the net multiple: low reliability and high volatility. The 
results of gross EBITDA-Transaction multiple fair value are not reported in the 
figure, because the Net Transaction (reported as dark gray with lines fill bar) is a 
mere proportional reduction of the gross value (that, thus, would be even higher than 
it is for the “Net” multiple). 
 
Table 11: Gross EBITDA-Transaction-multiple-fair-value percent difference from 
market capitalization 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. +21.8 +104.1 +50.9 +24.3 +62.8 +19.0 (21.4) (14.4) (14.7) +0.2 (21.4) 
Source: our processing. 
   
11 
Figure 1: Normalized results for full portfolio – Stock multiples 
 
Source: our processing. Equity stands for Book Value of Equity. Market Cap stands for Market capitalization, FV_by_PE is the fair value calculated via the P/E 














2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EQUITY MARKET_CAP FV_by_PE EV_by_EV_SALES
EV_by_EV_EBITDA EV_by_EV_EBIT EV_by_NET_TRANS_EBITDA Polin. (MARKET_CAP)
Polin. (FV_by_PE) Polin. (EV_by_EV_SALES) Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBITDA) Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBIT)
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Figure 2: Normalized results for full portfolio – Forward multiples  
 
Source: our processing. Equity stands for Book Value of Equity. Market Cap stands for Market capitalization, FV_by_PE is the fair value calculated via the P/E 














2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EQUITY MARKET_CAP FWD_FV_by_PE
FWD_EV_by_EV_SALES FWD_EV_by_EV_EBITDA FWD_EV_by_EV_EBIT
Polin. (MARKET_CAP) Polin. (FWD_FV_by_PE) Polin. (FWD_EV_by_EV_SALES)
Polin. (FWD_EV_by_EV_EBITDA) Polin. (FWD_EV_by_EV_EBIT)
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4.2. Analysis of the portfolio trends and volatility in the financial statements: estimation 
of the variation of the portfolio evaluation and its effects on P/L statement 
The next step of our analysis consists in the appraisal of the effects that the consistent 
application of the multiples could have on the financial statement, and in particular on the 
assets and on the earnings, in the case of implementation of the IFRS principles. In fact, 
differences between the market capitalization and the fair values estimates deploy their 
effects not only in the year of evaluation but also in the following years. The effect of the 
errors in a single year shows the over- or under-estimation of the asset value. The 
variation between two consequent years reflects the error on the profit and losses 
statement, thus on the earnings. Table 12 shows the variations of the portfolio value for 
each of the different multiple over time. Such variations have to be compared with the 
variations in the market capitalizationii.  
 





























Equity 37.9 85.9 80.9  80.2  32.1 63.2 87.2  72.9  15.41 48.7  72.7  44.0  38.0 85.9 
Market cap 145.9 277.2 338.3 216.2 (734.1) 214.3 139.4 (200.1) 222.4 356.3 60.3 244.9 121.5 280.3 
P/E 426.9 254.7 384.9 420.6 (1309.5) 399.2 60.7 (222.6) 131.1 433.5 (45.3) 428.8 (215.0) 354.9 
P/E fwd 255.5 344.2 331.8 274.7 (742.2) 147.1 (96.8) (56.9) 61.3 460.2 (168.5) 289.1 (34.1) 313.6 
EV/sales 274.4 256.8 382.8 (43.9) (840.2) 375.4 131.3 (212.3) 181.0 408.1 317.8 482.6 (146.6) (62.2) 
EV/sales fwd 157.7 167.9 273.8 32.3 (685.3) 515.8 (119.5) (160.4) 158.4 381.4 208.5 405.8 9.9 (268.8) 
EV/EBITDA 338.6 500.1 289.9 45.0 (965.6) 671.7 (152.8) (27.9) 329.9 (51.7) 317.0 283.3 170.7 (355.0) 
EV/EBITDA fwd 214.7 295.9 376.0 (62.2) (657.6) 564.1 (199.2) (144.5) 406.4 308.1 (108.2) 174.8 70.8 (104.3) 
EV/EBIT 279.0 590.6 191.3 134.2 (861.1) 679.1 (184.7) (61.2) 299.2 208.4 54.2 126.8 205.0 (168.4) 
EV/EBIT fwd 212.4 334.7 186.0 79.4 (519.8) 533.1 (188.9) (71.6) 356.0 213.4 (95.3) 101.2 207.1 (68.0) 
Net Trans. EBITDA     84.8 (219.7) (139.4) 187.3 (225.1) (243.6) 122.8 133.0 298.7 (193.1) 
Source: our processing. 
  
Figure 3 shows the over- or under-estimation of the portfolio variations, thus the extra-
profit or loss due just to the different method of fair value measurement. Namely, it shows 
the variation in the fair value calculated by each multiple that exceeds the variation 
of the market capitalization. This should eliminate the intrinsic volatility of the 
enterprises in the portfolio, by showing the extra-profits or extra-losses not related 
to market risk factors (comprised in the fluctuations of market capitalizations) but 
caused by the mere usage of the evaluation method. 
In particular, the EBIT(DA) based historical multiples show a high level of unreliability, 
with great over- and under-estimations almost never lower than ±10% (±100‰). The P/E 
multiple, due to the great volatility, shows peaks of variation during peculiar economic 
conditions, such as the market turmoil of 2007-2009. The EV/sales multiple shows great 
volatility during the economic recovery period (2013-2017), but it seems to be less 
sensitive to crises and stagnations and more conservative. The transaction multiples has 
a great volatility and thus a high unreliability with overestimations in most cases greater 
than +20% and underestimation lower than –20% (± 200‰).  
The forward counterparts of each multiple show more or less the same fluctuations, just 
a bit more moderate than the “historical” ones. Nevertheless, this moderation in the 
fluctuations goes along with the unreliability described in the previous section, where the 
values are in most cases lower than the market capitalization. Taken as a whole, forward 
multiples provide more conservative results. 
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Figure 3: Surplus of profit/losses (per-thousand) by applying the historical market multiples  
 
Source: our processing. Equity stands for Book Value of Equity. Market Cap stands for Market capitalization, FV_by_PE is the fair value calculated via the P/E 


















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
FV_by_PE EV_by_EV_SALES EV_by_EV_EBITDA EV_by_EV_EBIT
EV_by_NET_TRANS_EBITDA Polin. (FV_by_PE) Polin. (EV_by_EV_SALES) Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBITDA)
Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBIT) Polin. (EV_by_NET_TRANS_EBITDA)
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Figure 4: Surplus of profit/losses (per-thousand) by applying the forward market multiples  
 
Source: our processing. Equity stands for Book Value of Equity. Market Cap stands for Market capitalization, FV_by_PE is the fair value calculated via the P/E 


















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EV_by_PE_FWD EV_by_EV_SALES_FWD EV_by_EV_EBITDA_FWD_P EV_by_EV_EBIT_FWD_P
Polin. (EV_by_PE_FWD) Polin. (EV_by_EV_SALES_FWD) Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBITDA_FWD_P) Polin. (EV_by_EV_EBIT_FWD_P)
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4.3. Descriptive statistics and distribution of the estimated-to-real fair value 
ratios 
In order to investigate whether the differences between the portfolio real and 
estimated values are statistically significant, we focus on the distribution of the ratios. 
Accordingly, we calculate the ratio between the estimated value and the market 
capitalization for each company and for each year. 
As reported in appendix D, the first quartile of the Market Multiples to Market Cap 
ratios distributions range around a value of 0.60-0.70. This implies that, at single 
company level, market multiples estimate a fair value that is more or less 30% to 
40% lower than the actual market capitalization. The median of the ratio stands in a 
0.9-1.5 range. This means that in half of the cases it is higher than a 1:1 ratio. In more 
than the 75% of the cases, the market multiples at a single-company level are not 
even close to the real fair value. 
Furthermore, estimates distribution has a right tail (skewness greater than 0) and 
that the values concentrate greatly around the mean, which is greater than 1.30 in 
most cases. This means that, in most of the single company estimations of fair values, 
the market multiples return a result that is greater than 1 and on average 30% higher. 
As for the forward multiples, the first quartile and the median are much lower than 
the historical multiple, which is consistent with the results found at portfolio level, 
where the fair value of the portfolio calculated with P/E forward is mostly lower than 
the market capitalization. By looking at single periods, results are consistent with 
previous analysis. The standard deviation at period level varies greatly, showing that 
there is a large volatility in the application of the technique, even at a single-company 
level. 
 
5. Comments and conclusions 
In day-to-day life, both practitioners tend to use the market and transaction 
multiples in the estimation of the fair value of private equities.  
In order to test the reliability of fair value estimates based on market and 
transaction multiples in measuring fair values, we have considered a sample of 
public companies, which we have treated as if they were private. We have 
therefore assessed their fair value by using Level 2 inputs. We have used market 
capitalization as their real fair value, which is consistent with the market 
efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1970). We have then compared fair value estimates 
based on transaction and market multiples with market capitalization to test for 
estimation errors. 
Our results are consistent with previous research and show that market 
multiples introduce great estimation errors in assessing the fair value of private 
equities. More specifically, the results of our analysis, which have been conducted 
on data from over 1500 companies over 15 years, show that none of the market 
multiples is capable of appraising the real market value of a portfolio except in just 
a few single cases. The use of forecasted (“forward”), rather than historical multiples 
slightly improves the performance of some of the multiples, in particular for the P/E 
multiple, which is consistent with Lie & Lie (2002). Nonetheless, this improvement 
does not hold during market crises and high-volatility periods.  
Moreover, such an inconsistency and unreliability generates economic effects both 
in the year of measurement and in the following years, with a surplus of profits/losses 
that tend to be greater than those of market capitalization. In more than three out of 
four cases, market multiples at single-company level greatly underestimate or 
overestimate the real fair value, and in more than half of the cases the measurement 
overestimates it. The unreliability of market multiples is particularly exacerbated in the case 
of EBITDA and EBIT. 
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Our analysis is slightly limited for the transaction multiples in the years 2010 and 2014, 
because in some portfolios and in some years it is not possible to calculate a transaction 
multiple. Also in this case, however, there is compelling evidence that transaction multiples 
do not provide reliable fair value estimates either. 
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that market and transaction multiples probably do not 
catch firm-specific risk factors that affect the actual fair value of the firm, as reflected in 
market capitalization. Indeed, the use of mean and median for market multiples calculated 
for each industry tend to elide the idiosyncratic component of risk. Along the same lines, 
transaction multiples incorporate expectations related to specific transactions, which may be 
not applicable to others.  
Such issues should be carefully taken into consideration by regulators. The risk is that fair 
value estimates based on transaction and market multiples may mislead investors in 
perceiving the financial data as highly reliable. Therefore, evidence on this point is of direct 
interest to accounting policymakers since the explicit purpose of the EU Regulation 
1606/2002, which has introduced the IAS/IFRS accounting system in the EU, is to ensure a 
high degree of transparency and comparability in financial statements as well as the efficient 




The appendix is stored in a separate document. The related file can be found at the 
following permanent link: https://goo.gl/hsjteC. 
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i As the difference is not significant, the robustness check is not tabled. 
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the variations reported in the table is a “per thousand” result. 
 
